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Terrorism and Afghanistan

Yoram Dinstein*
1. Terrorism as an Armed A ttack
A. The "War on Terrorism »

T

he expression "war on terrorism" is mere1y a figure of speech or a metaphor:
it is not different in princi ple from the parallel phrases "war on drugs" and
"war on poverty." The reason is that the expression " war" is not used in either context as a legal term of art. This is easily grasped by anyone who knows in ternational
law. But the trouble with a catchy phrase is that it is apt to catch its users in a net: in

time. they (especially if they are laypersons and not international legal experts)
tend to believe that the figure of speech which they have coined actually reflects
reality.
Metapho rs aside, there are two types of war pursuant to international law:
inter-State (in ternational armed conflicts) and intra-State ("civil wars" or noninternational armed conflicts ). In an in ternational armed conflict, two or more
belligerent States are locked in combat with each other. Large n wnbers of States are
currently engaged in the global "war on terrorism.» Yet, the strife qualifies as war in
the international legal sense only when hostilities are raging against an enemy State
that has joined hands with the terrorists. As we shall see, this is true only in the case
of Afghanistan. I
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Terrorism and Afghanistan
A "civil war" is an armed conflict between the central government of a State and a
group (or groups) of domestic insurgents, or (absent a central government) between
various factions vying for power in the State. Whether an internal disturbance
crosses the threshold of a non-international armed conflict is a matter of gravity of
scale and intensity. The United States, which has gone through the throes of a genuine "civil war" in its history, should know one when it sees it. In any event, the notion
that the cross-border, worldwide "war on terrorism" is a non-international armed
conflict-a notion that seems to have met with favor in the US Supreme Court, in
the Hamdan case of2006 2-is manifestly incongruous.
B. Internal Terrorism
In any analysis of the struggle against terrorism, the point of departure must be a
bifurcation between terrorism that is purely internal in character and that which is
launched from a foreign country and perhaps warrants action in or against that
foreign country. It is often forgotten that, until September II , 2001, some of the most
nefarious acts of terrorism were actually local in character. The mega-bombing in
Oklahoma City as well as the lethal activities of terrorists in Europe (such as Irish
Republican Army terrorists in the United Kingdom, Basque terrorists in Spain, the
"Red Brigades" in Italy and the Baader-Meinhof gang in Germany) and in Asia
(e.g., the Tamil "Tigers" in Sri Lanka, Moslem separatists in the Philippines and
sarin gas-wielding terrorists in the Tokyo subway) were all products of domestic
terrorism. Even when the atrocity of 9/11 occurred, it is symptomatic that for a
while nobody knew for sure whether it was an external or an internal attack. Thus,
when the NATO Council on September 12 decided for the firs t time ever to invoke
Article 5 of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty-whereby an armed attack against one
or more of the allies in Europe or North America "shall be considered an attack
against them all"l-this was qualified by a caveat that it be determined that the attack was directed from abroad against the United States. 4 Such a fact ual determination was made only subsequently, on the basis of additional information gathered.S
The answer to internal terrorism lies in law enforcement. In other words, domestic law enforceme nt agencies are expected to cope with the crime by searching
for the terrorists (if they are not killed or captured in the act and are in hiding),
arresting them, collating the necessary evidence, issuing an indictment, holding a
trial (based, of course, on due process oflaw), securing a conviction, seeking a
punishment that fits the crime and ensuring that the court's sentence is in fact
carried out (so that a convicted terrorist is not pardoned or otherwise released
from jail before the prescribed time). The law enforcement agencies-the police
(in all its incarnations, embracing an agency like the FBI in the United States) and

44

Yoram Dinstein
the judiciary-may act on the national (or federal) or local (including state, city
or rural) level.
Even when terrorism is a matter of domestic law enforcement there may be a
dire need of foreign cooperation. This may be the case either because some material witness or evidence is located abroad, or-if a terrorist manages to flee to a foreign country-because extradition (based on a treaty in force ) o r some other (less
formal) means of rendition is required in order to bring the fugitive to justice. Success in the extradition of a terrorist may be contingent o n the requested country
not considering his/her act as "political" in character. Stripping terrorism of a political mantle is the thrust of the 1977 European Convention o n the Suppression of
Terrorism6 and the bilateral 1985 US-UK Supplementary Extradition Treaty,'
which has blazed the trail for a whole series of similar bilateral treaties concluded
by the United States in later years.
International cooperation is also required in a concerted effort to stop or at least
impede the financing of terrorism. This is the subject of the 1999 International
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.s More significantly, it is also the fulcrum of Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) ,9 an unprecedented landmark decision, whereby all UN mem ber States (whether or not
parties to the Convention ) are obligated to suppress the financing of terrorism , to
under the supelVision of a special body (the Counter-Terrorism Committee) that
monitors implementation.

C. Arm ed Attacks by Non-State Actors
The crux of the issue is whether an act of terrorism, launched from abroad by nonState actors, can be subsumed under the heading of an armed attack in the sense of
Article 5 1 of the Charter of the United Nations (namely, as a trigger to the target
State's exercising counterforce in self-defense). When a terrorist act originates outside the borders of the target State, a foreign State must somehow be implicated.
The reason is that it is indispensable for the terrorists to have a base of operations as
a springboard for their attack. Needless to say, such a base is not likely to be situated
on the high seas, in outer space or in an unclaimed and uninhabited par t of
Antarctica.
Article 51 of the Charter opens with the following words: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if
an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations." As can be seen,
Article 5 1 talks about an armed attack occurring against a State (a member of the
United Nations), but it does not say that the attack must be launched by another
State. This is particularly notable given the comparable phraseology of Article 2(4)
of the Charter, which mandates that all members (i.e., States) shall refrain from the
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use offorce in international relations.11 It follows that, under Article 51, an armed
attack need not be launched bya foreign State; it can also be launched by non-State
actors from a foreign State. I have always (even prior to 9/11 ) pursued this line of
thoUght,12 but many other commentators were not convinced in the past. 13 These
scholarly disagreements should now be regarded as moot, inasmuch as-since 9/11the general practice of States has become crystal clear.
The international response to 9/l1 was unequivocal. Preeminently, both in Resolution 1368 (2001) 14-adopted a day after9/11-and in the aforementioned Resolution 1373 (2001),1$ the Security Council recognized and reaffirmed in this
context "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance
with the Charter." The NATO stand has already been referenced. 16lt may be added
that in the September 2001 meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, acting as an
Organ of Consultation, in application of the 1947 Inter-American TreatyofRedprocal Assistance, it was resolved that "these terrorist attacks against the United
States of America are attacks against all American States."17 This must be understood in light of Article 3 of the Rio Treaty, which refers specifically to an armed attack and to the right of self-de fense pursuant to Article 5 1. 18
It is true that, in the 2004 advisory opinion on Legal Consequences of the Construction ofa Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the International Court of
Justice (lCD enunciated: "Article 51 of the Charter thus recognizes the existence of
an inherent right of self-defence in the case of armed attack by one State against another State."19 However, as correctly observed by Judge Higgins in her separate
opinion: "There is, with respect, nothing in the text of Article 51 that thus stipulates
that self-defence is available only when an armed attack is made by a State."20 Similar criticism was expressed in the separate opinion ofJudge Kooijmans 21 and in the
declaration of Judge BuergenthaL22 Indeed, the court itself noted without demur
Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373, drawing a distinction between the
situation contemplated by these texts (cross-border terrorism) and occupied
territories. 23
II. Action against Terrorists within a Foreign Territory

When terrorists perpetrate an armed attack against one State from within the territory of another State, there are three alternative scenarios of counteraction by the
target State.
A. Action by Consent of the Foreign State
The first possibility is that the foreign State completely dissociates itself from the
terrorists, who operate within its territory against its will. However, lacking the

46

Yoram Dinstein
military wherewithal to eliminate the terrorist bases by itself, the local State invites
the target State to send in its forces to accomplish (or assist in accomplishing) that
mission. In such circumstances, the armed forces of the target State will deploy and
operate against the terrorists on foreign soil with the consent of the government in
charge. There is no doubt about the legality of such action, as long as the target
State's expeditionary force carries out its mandate within the terms of the consent
as granted. Article 20 of the 2001 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, as formulated by the International Law Commission
(Il C), sets forth clearly: "Valid consent by a State to the commission of a given act
by another State precludes the wrongfulness of that act in relation to the former
State to the extent that the act remains within the limits of that consen t. "2~

B. Action against the Foreign State
The second scenario is the antithesis of the first. The terrorists may act with the full
approval and even instigation of the foreign State itself, which uses them as an irregular or paramilitary extension of its armed forces. In that case, the armed attack
is deemed to have been launched by the foreign State itself. In the Nicaragua case of
1986, the IC) pronounced that "it maybe considered to be agreed that an armed attack must be understood as including not merely action by regular armed forces
across an international border," but also the dispatch of armed bands or " irregulars" into the territory of another State. 15 "The sending by or on behalf of a State of
arm ed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which car ry out acts of armed
force against another State" is specifically branded as an act of aggression in Article
3(g) of the General Assembly's consensus Definition of Aggression adopted in
1974.26 In the Nicaragua judgment, the Ie ) took paragraph (g) of Article 3 "to reflect customary internationallaw."27 In the post-Nicaragua period, the IC) has
come back to rely on Article 3(g) in its opinion in the 2005 Congo/Uganda Armed
Activities case. 28 Interestingly, thus far, Article 3(g) is the only clause ofthe Definition of Aggression expressly held by the Ie) to be declaratory of customary internationallaw.
The linkage between terrorists and a foreign State may be entangled and not
easy to unravel. The cardinal question is whether the terrorists act as the de facto
organs of that State. In the Nicaragua judgment, it was categorically proclaimed
that, when the "degree of dependence on the one side and control on the other"
warrant it, the hostile acts of paramilitaries can be classified as acts of organs of
the foreign State. 29 Yet, the IC} held that it is not enough to have merely "general
control" by the foreign State. What has to be proved is "effective control" - in the
sense of close operational control--over the activities of the terrorists.30
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The ICJ's insistence on "effective control" by the foreign State over the local
paramilitaries can hardly be gainsaid. However, the proposition that "general control" does not amount to "effective control"-and that a dose operational control
is always required-is not universally accepted. Indeed, in 1999, the Appeals
Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal fo r the former Yugoslavia
(lCfY), in the Tadic case, sharply assailed the Nicaragua prerequisite of close operational control-as an absolute condition of "effective control"-maintaining that
this is inconsonant with both logic and law. 3l The ICfY Appeals Chamber pronounced that "overall control" would suffice and there is no need for close operational control in every case. n The doctrine of overall control has been consistently
upheld in successive ICTY judgments (both at the trial and the appeal levels) following the Tadic case. 33
Article 8 of the ILC 200 I Draft Articles on Responsibility of States reads: "The
conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under
international law if the person or group of persons is in faa acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in carrying o ut the conduct."34 From the comm entary one can draw theconc1usion that the ILC endorsed
the Nicaragua test of "effective control," although it conceded that the degree of
control may "vary according to the factual circumstances of each case."35
The IC} returned to the topic in the Genocide case of2oo7, where the previous
(Nicaragua ) position was upheld and the Tadic criticism rejected. 36 Nevertheless,
the ICI set forth that the "overall control" test of the ICfY may be "applicable and
suitable" when "employed to determine whether or not an armed conflict is international" (which was the issue in Tadic), b ut it cannot be presented "as equally applicable under the law of State responsibility for the purpose of determining ...
when a State is responsible for acts committed by paramilitary units, armed forces
which are not among its official organs.")1 The ICI added that
the degree and nature of a State's involvement in an armed conflict on another State's
territory which is required for the conflict to be characterized as international, can very
well, and without logical inconsistency, differ from the degree and nature of
involvement required to give rise to that State's responsibility for a specific act
committed in the course of the conflict. 38
It is doubtful whether the last word has been said on this theme.

C. "Extra-Territorial Law Enforcement"
There is a third scenario, intermediate between the two situations discussed so far.
While the foreign State is not backing the terrorists (who cannot be regarded as its
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de facto organs, under either the Nicaragua test or even the Tadic test), it withholds
consent from the target State to the dispatch of troops with a view to the eradication
of the terrorists. The question is whether the target State is at an impasse-unable to
act against the terrorists (absent consent) and having no ground to act against the
foreign State (absent complicity with the terrorists)-or there is some other avenue open for action in conformity with international law.
As a rule, under internat ional law, as per the 1949 ICJ judgment in the Corfu
Channel case, every State is under an obligation "not to allow knowingly its territory to be used fo r acts contrary to the rights of other States."39 Accordingly, a
State must not allow knowingly its territory to be used for terrorist attacks against
another State. The premise, of course, is that the local State is capable of rooting
out the terrorists who are targeting another State. If the local State is incapable of
doing that (for military o r other reasons), the target State-invoking the right of
self-defense--is entitled to respond to the terrorist anned attack. In other words,
the target State is allowed to respond to the arm ed attack mounted from within the
territory of the local State by doing what the local State should have done in the first
place but failed to do. The emphasis is on the fact that, in these circumstances, the
target State can employ force against the terrorists (in self-defense) within the territory of the local State, even without the consent of the government in charge. I
call this exceptional state of affairs "extra-territorial law enforceme nt,"40 but the
nomenclature is not of major import: it is the normative substance that counts.
The fons et origo of the nor m in question is a famous dictum fonnulated by US Secretary of State Daniel Webster in resolving the Caroline incident of 1837.41
A paradigmatic illustration of the application in practice of "extra-territorial
law enforcement" is the recent expedition of Turkish troops into northern Iraq,
with a view to the elimination of Kurdish terrorists operating from that area against
Turkey. Nobody is suggesting that the Iraqi government in Baghdad-or even the
authority in control of the Kurdish enclave of northern Iraq-is in complicity with
the terrorists, who belong to a renegade group. Nevertheless, since the terrorists are
using Iraqi territory as their base of anti-Turkish operations, and the rather fragile
government of Iraq is incapable of coming to grips with the problem at this time,
Turkey has the right to do what the Iraqi government should have done but failed to
do. There is no anned conflict between Turkey and Iraq. What we do have is "extraterritorial law enforcement" by Turkey in Iraq.
I am glad to note that in the IC] 2005 decisio n in the Armed Activities on the Territory olthe Congo case (Congo/Uganda), although the majority judgment glossed
over the issue, two judges in their separate o pinions-Judge Kooijmans and] udge
Simma---cited my position on the subject.42 In doing so, Judge Kooijmans said: " It
would be unreasonable to deny the attacked State the right to self-defence merely
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because there is no attacker State, and the Charter does not so require. "43 And
Judge Simma concurred. 44
As for the majority position, all that I can say is that-in the past quarter of a
century-the ICJ addressed the issue of self-defense four times, starting with the
1986 Nicaragua case 45 and going through the Oil Platforms case of 2003,46 the Wall
advisory opinion of 200447 and the 2005 Armed Activities case. 48 Self-defense was
also mentioned on a fifth occasion (the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion of
199649 ). Is it mere1y a coincidence of bad luck that in all these separate proceedings
the ICJ made serious blunders in the interpretation of the law of self-defense? In
the Nicaragua judgment there were a number of flagrant flaws, e.g., as regards the
distinction between more and less grave forms of use of force, the differentiation
between an armed attack and mere frontier incidents, the non-mention of immediacy as a condition of self-defense, the denial of the right of a third State to act in
collective self-defense on the basis of its own assessment of the situation and the
ramifications of failure to report to the Security Council. so In the Oil Plat/onns
case, apart from repeating uncritically earlier rulings, the court added some dubious new dicta about the need for an armed attack to be aimed specifically at a target
State (as if indiscriminate but deliberate mine-laying in international shipping
lanes is not enough).51 In the Wall advisol)' opinion, we have the untenable brief
statement on the need for an anned attack to be mounted by one State against
another State. 51 In the Armed Activities case, the court ignored the issue of "extraterritorial law enforcement."53 And in the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion, the
mention of self-defense comes in the most awkward fashion, in a notorious
dispositi/in which the court wrongly meshed the jus in bello with the jus ad bellum.54
The paradox is that, in 1986, scholars who critiqued the Nicaragua judgment
(like me) thought that the ICI plummeted to a nadir. But the Nicaragua judgment
at least gave commentators an opportunity to chew on some juicy morsels of prime
beef. A quarter of a century later, with decisions that are much more lean-to the
point of being cryptic and even mystifying-we tend to think of the Nicaragua
judgment, in retrospect, as the acme of the ICJ contribution on the subject.

111. The War in Afghanistan
A. Armed Attack and Self-Defense
Initially, Taliban-ledAfghanistan was not directly involved in the armed attack unleashed byal Qaeda against the United States on 9/11. The Taliban regime in Kabul
became tainted due to its subsequent behavior. In its judgment of 1980 in the Teh ran case, the IC) held that ifthe authorities of one State are required under international law to take appropriate acts in order to protect the interests of another State,
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and-while they have the means at their disposal to do so-completely fail to comply with their obligations, the inactive State bears international responsibility toward the other State. 55 By offering a haven to al Qaeda, in disregard of its
obligations under international law-and disdaining binding Security Council
resolutions adopted even before 9/11 56- the Taliban regime assumed responsibility fo r the armed attack against the United States and opened the way to the exercise of forcible US response in self-defense.
Once the Taliban's brazen refusal to take the required steps against al Qaeda following 9/1 1 became evident, the United States issued an ultimatum, imperatively
demanding that the al Qaeda bases be closed down and that its leaders be handed
overY When the Taliban ignored the ultimatum, the United States (with several
allies) went to war on October 7, 2001 . At that juncture, the Taliban regime---despite
its fa ilure to gain wide recognition---constituted the de facto government of Afghanistan because it was in actual control of more than 90 percent of the country.58
A non-international armed conflict had independently flared up in Afghanistan
long beforehand. This conflict was waged between the Taliban regime, on the one
hand, and the Northern Alliance, on the other. Once the inter-State war (the
United States and its allies versus Taliban-Ied Afghanistan and its al Qaeda ally)
broke out, it was prosecuted simultaneously with the intra-State war (the Taliban
versus the Northern Alliance) that went on until the fall of Kabul. The two wars
(inter-State and intra-State), although connected, must be analyzed separately.
B. International and Non -International Armed Conflicts
Contral)' to conventional opinion, I believe that the inter-State war in Afghanistan
that started on October 7, 2001 continues unabated to this vel)' day, despite the
transformation in the status of the Taliban (who no longer form the de fac to government of Afghanistan). When American and allied troops are fighting the
Taliban (and their al Qaeda ally) on Afghan or adjacent (Pakistani) soil, this is a direct sequel to the hostilities that led to the ouster of the Taliban from the seat of
power in Kabul. Both segments (past and present) of the hostilities are consecutive
scenes in the same drama unfolding in Afghanistan. The inter-State war will not be
over until it is over. And it will only be over once the Taliban are crushed.
We still have in Afghanistan-side by side with the inter-State war (the United
States et al. versus the Taliban )-an intra-State war (the Taliban versus the Karzai
government in Kabul). Except that, in terms of the intra-State war, the shoe is now
on the other foot: the Karzai government is installed as the de jure government of
Afghanistan, whereas the Taliban-originally the central government (if only de
facto )-are the insurgents. For the credentials ofthe Karzai government, it is advisable to go back to Security Council Resolution 1386, adopted on December 20,
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2001, which-acting under Chapter VII (Le., in a binding manner)-(i) endorsed
the Bonn Agreement, concluded earlier that month between various Afghan political factions, and (ii) gave its approval to the deployment of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in consultation with the Afghan Interim Authority
established by the Bonn Agreement. 59
As long as the international armed conflict goes on in Afghanistan, the jlls in
bello in all its manifestations is applicable to the hostilities there. The singular feature of the inter-State war in Afghanistan is that it is conducted on Afghan soil with
the consent of the Karzai government. This means that, at any point in time, the
Karzai government (or, in the future, a successor Afghan government) may withdraw that consent and pull the rug out from under the fee t of the United States and
ISAF. The latter are fully conscious of the need to avert such an unwelcome development. If the United States (as heard at the conference) is applying in the field unusual constraints relating to collateral damage---compared to the general strictures
imposed by the jlls in bello-this is not an indication that the jus in bello is undergoing a metamorphosis. It simply shows that the United States is responsive to the
concerns of the Afghan government, in whose territory the combat takes place. The
government of Afghanistan is fully entitled to insist on the fighting against the
Taliban (and al Qaeda) being conducted with minimal civilian casualties from
among its citizenry.
Due to the special circumstances of the hostilities in Afghanistan-primarily,
the intimate relationship characterizing the alliance between the Taliban and al
Qaeda-US and allied combat operations against both (as long as they are conducted in and around Afghanistan, including in particular the lawless tribal lands
of Pakistan ), are clearly fused in a single inter-State armed conflict.
The differences from the vantage point of the jus in bello between the parallel international and non-international armed conflicts in progress in Afghanistan showd
not be exaggerated. Despite the profound disparity between the two types of armed
conflicts from the angle of the jus ad bellllm, there is a growing tendency to apply
much of the jus ill bello to both categories equally.60 Apart from issues of semantics
(exemplified by inappropriate usage of terms such as "belligerent parties" or even
"combatants"), there are only three components of the jus ill bello in international
armed conflicts that-intrinsically----defy application in non -international armed
conflicts. These are the entitlement to the status of prisoners of war, the law of neutrality and belligerent occupation.
Even in the last three respects, there may be some analogies or similarities. The
rule of non-intelVention on behalf of the insurgents by foreign States takes the
place of the norms of neutrality. Detention of captured personnel in accordance
with minimal requirements of hwnan rights comes in lieu of the treatment of
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prisoners of war. But there is no avoiding the fact that-in the absence of recognition ofbelligerency--<aptured insurgents can be indicted and convicted for treason. In countries maintaining capital punishment, upon conviction defendants
may be sentenced to death. In other jurisdictions, they may languish in jail for life.
Recognition of belligerency, issued by the central government in the face of
large-scale rebellion (as happened in the American Civil War), denotes that a noninternational armed conflict will be governed by exactly the same rules that are applicable in international anned conflicts.61 It is occasionally alleged that recognition of belligerency has falle n into disuse and that, even if it were to occur, only
"common Article 3 and not the [Geneva] Conventions as a whole will apply to the
conflict."62 However, Common Article 3 applies anyhow to any "armed conflict
not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties,"6l and this is not contingent on any recognition of belligerency.
Should such recognition be granted, it would undoubtedly signal that the conflict
has to be treated as ifit were an international armed conflict and that all the norms
of the jus it! bello (including those relating to the status of prisoners of war, neutrality and belligerent occupation) will become applicable.
The dilemma of recognition of belligerency is for the present Afghan government to wrestle with and resolve as it deems fit. This does not affect the United
States, since-in any event, as stated 64-its armed conflict with the Taliban (as well
as their al Qaeda ally) has been and remains international in nature. When Taliban
personnel are captured by American troops, they have to be treated in accordance
with the jlls it! bello. These captives cannot be considered guilty of treason against
the United States (although the Afghan perspective maybe different). In principle,
they would have been entitled to prisoner of war status. However, they may be denied that privilege due to the fact that they are unlawful combatants. I addressed in
some detail the meaning and consequences of unlawful combatancy at the 2002
Newport conference on terrorism (shortly after the outbreak of the Afghan War),6S
and I do not wish to repeat here what I said there. I also do not wish to pursue the
domestic-constitutional issue of the rights of unlawful combatants to habeas corpus
within the American judicial system. I merely want to emphasize that Taliban internees held on Afghan soil in a US detention center (e.g., in Bagram) can be kept
there only as long as the Afghan government allows the United States to maintain
such facilities within Afghan territory.

C. Action against Terrorists outside Afghanistan
Action taken by the United States and numerous other countries against al Qaeda
and diverse groups of terrorists in far-flung parts of the globe, beyond the borders
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of Afghanistan and its environs, do not constitute an integral part of the inter-State
war raging in Afghanistan .
AI Qaeda has been active in many parts of the world, ranging from Mesopotamia to Somalia, from Hamburg to Madrid. In each instance, a discrete dissection of
the legal situation is required. However, there is one common denominator,
namely, the absence of any built-in nexus between the measures taken for the suppression of the local version of terrorism and the inter-State war in Afghanistan. In
Iraq there is another war which, hopefully, is drawing to a close. In other places, the
measures taken against the terrorists m ust be seen in the context of law enforcement,66 leavened with sporadic injections of judicial and extrajudicial assistance
and cooperation by foreign States.

N . A New Paradigm?
I cannot resist adding a few words in response to a plea heard at the conference to
come up with a new paradigm regarding the law of armed conflict. This is by no
means the first occasion on which I have heard such an exhortation, and I am no
longer surprised when it comes up. While all international wars are alike, no two
wars are truly similar to each other. After every major war, it is perhaps natural that
the international law of armed conflict is weighed and found wanting given the
novel challenges specific to that war. When the challenges accumulate, it is frequentlysuggested that a new paradigm is required. After World War I, the international community was reeling from the carnage of trench warfare and the
widespread use of gas warfare. After World War II, humankind was shocked by the
horrors of the extermination camps and compelled to take into account the impact
of atomic weapons. In both world wars it was contended that they were a category
unto their own, since they constituted "Total Wars." Then came the Vietnam War,
which was supposedly unique for it consisted of guerrilla warfare. Kosovo was singular, because it was exclusively an air campaign. And so it goes: each war leaves its
special footprints in the sand of time.
As a matter of fact-and of law-I do not see any pressing need for a new paradigm. Of course, there are always new technologies, new weapons and new
methods of warfare. What these novelties convey is that the law of warfare lags
behind the actualities of the battleground. Yet, this is not an exclusive hallmark of
the jus in bello. To a greater or lesser degree, all law lags behind reality. Lawyers always have to trail events, trying to close gaps that have opened up between real
life and the law.
There is a great deal of reluctance on the part of most States today to close any
such gap---when it becomes readily apparent-by means of a form al treaty, if only
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because most treaty making today in the field of the jus in bello is controversial.
However, recent restatements 67 show that informal texts (if properly structured
and formulated) may prove almost as effective as fo rmal treaties.
In any event, the very difficulty of adopting new treaties only reinvigorates the
argument against the practicability of setting up a new paradigm. With an old paradigm---even if it is far fro m perfect-at least we know where we stand. The need to
have a quid pro quo of rights and obligations has been accentuated at this conference, and indisputably this is the rub. The advantage of the present law of both international and non- international armed conflicts is that, by and large, we stand on
te"ajirma: we know who is bound or entitled to do what. Admittedly, the nuclei of
legal clarity are surrounded by patinas of ambiguity and controversy. But this is the
inevitable state of all legal norms. The trouble with an innovative legal paradigm is
that it unbalances the existing paradigms. It is prone to plunge the entire legal system into a chaotic transition period in which legal certainty is eroded. Where the
jus in bello is concerned, what is liable to happen is that the notorious "fog of war"
will become the "fog of the law of war."
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